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ABSTRACT 
 
Designed to fulfill a critical inspection need for the Space Shuttle Program, the EVA IR Camera System 
can detect crack and subsurface defects in the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) sections of the Space 
Shuttle’s Thermal Protection System (TPS).  The EVA IR Camera performs this detection by taking 
advantage of the natural thermal gradients induced in the RCC by solar flux and thermal emission from the 
Earth. 
This instrument is a compact, low-mass, low-power solution (1.2cm3, 1.5kg, 5.0W) for TPS inspection that 
exceeds existing requirements for feature detection.  Taking advantage of ground-based IR thermography 
techniques, the EVA IR Camera System provides the Space Shuttle program with a solution that can be 
accommodated by the existing inspection system.  The EVA IR Camera System augments the visible and 
laser inspection systems and finds cracks and subsurface damage that is not measurable by the other 
sensors, and thus fills a critical gap in the Space Shuttle’s inspection needs.   
This paper discusses the on-orbit RCC inspection measurement concept and requirements, and then 
presents a detailed description of the EVA IR Camera System design.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During Space Shuttle Columbia’s last mission in 2003, ground video imagery indicated that insulating 
foam fell from the External Tank left bipod ramp during ascent and struck Columbia under its left wing.  A 
Debris Assessment Team (DAT) was formed to study the strike.  Unfortunately, the DAT did not have 
sufficient imagery and analysis tools with which to assess the severity of the strike, and the Mission 
Management Team (MMT) decided to postpone further assessment until after landing. 
Following the accident, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded that the foam struck 
the left wing leading edge of Columbia near reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panel 8, and that the resultant 
RCC damage provided a path for superheated air to penetrate the wing during reentry.  The superheated air 
melted the aluminum structure within the wing, and Columbia disintegrated over Texas. 
The CAIB made a series of recommendations to NASA that are intended to prevent future such accidents.  
Recommendation 6.4-1 calls for NASA to develop a comprehensive tile and RCC inspection and repair 
capability.  NASA responded to this recommendation by implementing a suite of on-orbit inspection tools 
that are capable of detecting most critical RCC damage.  The first line of inspection is the Orbiter Boom 
Sensor System (OBSS) which includes one video camera and two lasers mounted on the end of a long 
boom.  The OBSS is programmed to scan all RCC surfaces during flight in order to initially detect any 
RCC damage. 
If any damage is detected by the OBSS scan, a crewmember will conduct an extravehicular activity (EVA) 
to perform a more detailed inspection of the damage site.  During this detailed inspection, the crewmember 
will employ two additional inspection tools: the EVA Digital Camera and the EVA IR Camera.  The EVA 
Digital Camera is needed to acquire high-resolution visible imagery of the surface RCC damage, and EVA 
IR Camera is needed to determine the extent of subsurface RCC damage. 
The data collected during the detailed inspection will enable the MMT to decide whether to fly “as is”, 
repair the damage, or take safe haven on the International Space Station (ISS).  Also, if a repair is required, 
the detailed inspection will help the MMT decide how to make the repair.  For example, a small crack with 
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little underlying damage may only require a filler repair, while a small crack with much underlying damage 
may require a patch repair. 
Although the Columbia accident occurred in February, 2003, the need for an EVA IR Camera to detect 
underlying RCC damage was not recognized by the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) until November, 2004.  
At that time, the project team laid out an aggressive schedule to deliver a camera system for flight by STS-
115 (the third flight back), and the SSP strongly encouraged the team to deliver the camera system by STS-
121 (the second flight back).  In the end, the team delivered the camera system for STS-114 (the first flight 
back); an EVA IR Camera was launched in July, 2005, aboard the Shuttle Discovery, and it is presently on 
ISS. 
In addition to schedule constraints, the EVA IR Camera development had technology, operational, and 
funding constraints.  In order to detect underlying RCC damage with infrared thermography, a thermal 
gradient through the RCC panel must be created.  On the ground, inspectors use large flash lamps to create 
the thermal gradient.  However, packaging a flash lamp for space is impractical, because it is bulky.  Also, 
high voltages within the lamp may pose a safety risk. 
Rather than packaging a flash lamp for space, the EVA IR Camera project team conducted a series of tests 
on the ground to demonstrate that sunlight and shadowing could be used to create an adequate thermal 
gradient through the RCC panels.  This greatly simplifies the development task and helps control project 
costs.  However, it also increases operational complexity, because crewmembers are constrained to 
inspecting the RCC in sunlight. 
Given the urgency with which the program needed to have use of the EVA IR Camera for RCC inspection 
together with the immaturity of using infrared thermography in space for RCC damage detection, the SSP 
directed the project to limit its initial scope to building flight units certified as safe to test the application of 
infrared thermography for on-orbit RCC inspection rather than to building flight units certified to detect 
specific RCC damage. 
The SSP plans to conduct two flight tests with the EVA IR Camera: one on STS-121, and another on STS-
115.  During these tests, crewmembers will image the vehicle wing leading edges to validate ground 
thermal models, and crewmembers will image RCC samples with known damage to compare with ground 
test results.  Together, these flight test data may later be used as part of an effort to certify that the EVA IR 
Camera can detect specific RCC damage. 
The SSP established a budget of $6.4M for development of the EVA IR Camera system and completion of 
the two flight tests.  The EVA IR Camera system development is completed, and uncharacteristic of most 
space flight projects, the project is on budget.  The team attributes the success of completing the system 
development ahead of schedule and on budget largely to having consistent customer advocacy, prototyping 
the system, getting early user feedback, having skilled key personnel, and having great teamwork. 
 
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
 
To convert a Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) camera into an instrument that could be used on board the 
Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) a System Requirements Document was written to direct 
the build process.   
The requirements can be broken into two major categories.  The first requirements were those dictated by 
the measurement itself.  That is, the functions we were required to build into the camera so that it could 
perform thermography on the RCC panels.  These requirements were written by the EVA IR Camera 
Project personnel.  
The second group of requirements dictated crew and vehicle safety.  The EVA IR Camera was designated a 
Demonstration Technology Objective (DTO) and used the Johnson Spaceflight Center identified JSC 
28484: Program Requirements Document for JSC Non-Critical Government Furnished Equipment and JSC 
26626: Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA) Generic Design Requirements Document as the parent documents 
for this mission.  There are 68 additional documents that are referenced in the parent documents that shaped 
the design of the camera. To guarantee the highest quality product, in cases where similar requirements 
were cited in the Reference Documents, the more stringent requirement was selected.  
 
The following requirements were addressed in the System Requirements Document: 
• Functional Requirements 
• Non-Functional Requirements 
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• External Interface Requirements 
• General Design and Construction Requirements 
• Structural Design Requirements 
• Electrical Design Requirements 
• Soft Goods Design Requirements 
• Human Factors Design Requirements 
• Ground Support Equipment Requirements 
• Customer Imposed Verification Requirements 
 
In all, there were 275 individual requirements written to direct the design and build of this camera.  For 
every requirement, a verification method was written to insure compliance.  Verification could be in the 
form of testing, similarity, or inspection and were written into a Verification and Validation Matrix. 
After the Requirements document and the Verification and Validation Matrix were completed, they went 
through a review process.  Only after this review process was complete could the build begin. 
 
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION PLAN 
 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Infrared (IR) Camera System successfully passed through an extensive 
Verification and Validation (V&V) program to confirm that the EVA IR Camera, associated components 
and end items comply with specifications in the Systems Requirements, EIC 0002, and function properly as 
an integrated unit.  Verification of the EVA IR Camera functional capabilities and subsystem performance 
was performed through analyses using non-real-time tools, tests using real-time test facilities, inspection as 
it applies to the manufacturing processes used in hardware fabrication and software generation, and 
assessment as it applies to human factors, maintainability, accessibility, and transportability of the system 
features. 
Environmental Testing Summary: 
The camera units were put through a rigorous environmental test program which included an extensive 
burn-in test, acceptance thermal vacuum test, acceptance vibration test, shock test, bench handling drop 
test, packaged drop test, qualification thermal vacuum test, and qualification vibration test, electromagnetic 
compatibility test, off-gassing testing. The following table indicates the testing performed on each camera 
system developed: 
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E1 Engineering/Training Unit C C C C C Button enclosure outside chamber
E2 Engineering Unit C C C C C C C C Two week return required after radiation tests
F1 Flight Unit (STS-114) C C C C C C C C C K
F2 Flight Unit (STS-121) C C C C C C C C C K
F3 Flight Unit (JSC Spare) C C S S S S S S C S K
F4 Flight / Qual Unit C C C C C C C C C C Qualification unit
F6 Flight Unit (ISS) C C S S S S S S S K
F7 Flight Unit (LaRC Spare) C C S S S S S S S K
TA301 Test Article C C C C C
TA303 Test Article / Qual Unit C C C C C C
HARDWARE DESCRIPTION TEST DESCRIPTION COMMENTS
C Test Completed
P Test In-Process
S Test Pending
K  Kennedy
Note: 
Blank cells indicate no test 
planned or scheduled.
 
 
A short description of selected environment test performed is provided in the following sections: 
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ION Radiation Testing 
Elements of the EVA Infrared Camera were tested at the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility (IUCF) to 
assess their susceptibility to high-energy ionizing radiation.  All testing was done with proton beam energy 
of 200 Mega-electron Volts (MeV).  The normal beam diameter of approximately 6 cm was passed through 
various copper vignettes to adjust the size of the final beam allowed to radiate the test article. 
 
Power Cycle Burn-in 
Power Cycle Burn in test was completed at NASA Langley Research Center. The hot and cold operational 
temperature plateaus were determined using the manufacturers recommendations and were set at -5°C and 
40°C. The non-operational temperature plateaus were also determined using the manufacturer’s 
recommendations. However, because the camera system is turned off during this period, the temperature 
levels are much more extreme. The non-operational temperature levels during the burn in test were 
determined to be -30° and 60°C. Five cycles, were completed during the burn-in test. These five cycles 
were followed by a 48 hour, continuous, operational steady state period at an ambient temperature of 40°C. 
 
Thermal Vacuum Testing: 
The EVA-IR FM Camera systems was tested exposed to workmanship and qualification level thermal 
vacuum environment to ensure the systems can operate and perform for the intended STS Missions per 
NASA Specification Environmental Acceptance Testing per NASA-JSC-ST-T 0023, Revision C.  
As part of this test, the EVAIR Camera Systems were also be subjected to temperature ranges between -5C 
to +54C (+2C to +58C for the RCU). This thermal cycle was conducted in a vacuum of 1x10-5 torr or less. 
Test was conducted continuously for 1.5 thermal vacuum cycles prior to and following the thermal vacuum 
tests a pre/post performance functional check of the test article shall be performed. The functional check is 
an operational check of the test article to verify that all of the electronic components associated with the 
camera are working correctly, and were not damaged as a result of the high loads from the shock test.  
Qualification thermal vacuum testing was performed in a similar manner except that the camera system was 
subjected to temperature ranges between -15C to +64C (-8C to +68C for the RCU). 
 
Random Vibration 
The objective of the vibration test was to measure the dynamic response of the EVA-IR Camera Flight Unit 
when subjected to a base excitation corresponding to STS-114/121 launch environments. The measured 
response (acceleration) was used to determine the workmanship and design of the test article base input that 
replicates the launch environment of the STS-114/121 space flight vehicles.  
For the random vibration testing, the camera system was subjected to a random load spectrum that was 
based on the launch environment of the Mid-deck Locker area of the STS-114/121 space flight vehicles. 
The random test spectrum was a 6.1 grms vibration test over a frequency range of 20 to 2000 Hz. for one 
minute at full level. Prior to and following the random vibration tests a pre/post functional check was 
performed on the camera. The functional check is an operational check of the camera that verifies all of the 
electronic components associated with the camera were working correctly, and were not damaged as a 
result of the loads from the random vibration test. Qualification vibration testing was performed in a similar 
manner except that the random test spectrum was a 7.8 grms vibration test over a frequency range of 20 to 
2000 Hz. for one minute at full level. 
EMC Testing 
The EVA-IR Camera was required to be compatible with both the Space Shuttle environment and the 
Space Station Environment.  This limit, defined in SL-E-0002-Book 3, Volume 1, applies to external 
equipment.  As per SL-E-0002-Book 3, Section 5.11.1 testing is required up to 1 GHz or ten times the 
highest intentionally generated frequency within the EUT, whichever is greater.  The highest intentionally 
generated frequency within the EVA-IR Camera is 48 MHz, generated in the base camera.  Therefore, the 
radiated electric field emissions testing were required up to 1 GHz to show compliance with SL-E-002-
Book 3, Volume 1. 
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ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
In order to transform a Commercial, Off-The-Shelf (COTS) camera into a space flight qualified unit, 
several issues must be addressed. 
  
• Can the camera electronics tolerate the on-orbit thermal conditions? 
• Can the camera electronics operate and survive in a vacuum? 
• Can the camera electronics tolerate the radiation environment? 
• Can we use the vendor supplied batteries? 
• Will there be corona issues due to high voltages? 
• Will the outgassing of electrical components be within acceptable limits? 
• Any unnecessary electronics functions adding mass and draining power? 
 
The first and second concerns, operating at on-orbit thermal conditions and in a vacuum, were answered by 
testing the cameras in a thermal vacuum chamber.  We found that the camera operated normally in a 
vacuum, but some of the integrated circuits ran too hot.  To fix this problem, we formed copper heat straps 
and thermally bonded them to the integrated circuits (figure 1).  The other end was bolted to the metal 
frame of the camera.  We used thermal pads (Sil Pads) to fill gaps and maintain thermal conductivity where 
necessary.  Additionally, to guard against the possibility of the camera getting colder than storage limits, 
survival heaters and thermostats were installed. 
 
 
          
Figure 1 Copper thermal straps from Integrated Circuits to metal camera structure. 
 
 
Radiation tolerance was tested using the cyclotron at Indiana University.  This gave us insight into mean 
time between radiation upset events, and typical current profiles during single event upsets and latch-ups.  
The radiation tolerance of the COTS camera was deemed acceptable, but latch-up protection circuitry was 
designed and installed to provide an automatic power-down and reset functions in case of radiation induced 
failure on orbit. 
Space flight qualification for batteries is a complex and time consuming exercise.  Therefore, we decided to 
look for a pre-qualified battery to use in the camera.  We found that the EHIP battery (figure 2) was the 
right form factor and had the right amount of energy storage.  This is the battery used to power the 
headlights on the space suit helmets.  The camera housing was adapted to accept the EHIP battery.  The 
DC-DC converters were designed to convert the batteries 6 volts to 12 volts for camera use.  A battery 
voltage monitor was designed to alert the astronauts when approximately 75% of the battery charge is 
depleted. 
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         Figure 2.  EHIP Battery                                  Figure 3. LED backlight replacing Fluorescent tube 
 
During the vacuum testing it was discovered that the high voltage used for the cold cathode fluorescence 
(CCF) backlighting was generating a corona.  It was decided that LCD displays CCF would be replaced 
with an array of white LEDs (figure 3).  These LEDs were brighter than the CCF and would accommodate 
daylight viewing as well as eliminate the high voltage issue.   
Outgassing was tested by placing the camera into a vacuum along with a witness plate.  Contaminates 
condensed onto the witness plate and were analyzed for acceptability.  Any issued identified were 
corrected. 
In addition to structural modifications made to the camera, the visible camera (CCD) and eyepiece viewer 
were removed.  The visible camera was not needed and added to mass and power consumption.  The 
eyepiece couldn’t be used with the spacesuit helmet and therefore was removed.  A laser pointer supplied 
with the COTS camera was replaced by an eye safe laser that had been previously space qualified. 
 
 
THERMAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
 
The primary challenge for the thermal design of the EVA IR Camera is that the planned use for the 
instrument would occur in the harsh thermal environment of space.  Not only does space introduce both 
extremely hot and cold environments, it is without the presence of air.  The commercial-off-the-shelf units 
are, of course, thermally designed to operate in a standard pressure atmospheric environment.  The air helps 
to cool the internal electronic components during camera operation by conduction and convection.  Because 
the electronic components are designed to be thermally controlled using the ambient environmental 
temperature, they were not thermally coupled to the camera housing.  In a vacuum environment, only 
radiation and conduction can be used to maintain the electronic components within the operating 
temperature range.  As a result, 30 mil copper sheets were used to create a conductive path between the 
chips and the housing as shown in figure 1.  Several thermal/vacuum tests were performed using the 
engineering unit to determine the thermal resistance between the camera housing and the internal electronic 
components. The primary requirement for the thermal control subsystem design states that: 
The IR Camera System shall operate throughout the hot and cold extreme 
environments as defined by the ISS EVA Thermal Environments Database. 
The ISS EVA Thermal Environments Database (IETED) is an exhaustive database that provides transient 
heat flux cubes for approximately 190 locations around the International Space Station (ISS) and Space 
Shuttle.  The thermal subsystem for the IR camera was designed to ensure that the electronic components 
internal to the camera base unit (CBU) housing as well as the remote control unit (RCU) were maintained 
between the manufacturer’s published temperature limits of 0°C to 70°C.  The CBU dissipates 
approximately 6.5 Watts during its operational mode.  The RCU, on the other hand, dissipates 3.36 Watts.  
Therefore, the total power dissipation of the system is approximately 10 Watts during operation.  The 
thermal design was completed to ensure that the electronic components internal to the camera system stay 
within the manufacturer’s limit for the entire duration of an 8-hour EVA. 
A hot and cold thermal analysis was performed for both the RCU and the CBU to ensure that these units 
would operate when exposed to the extreme thermal environments defined by the IETED.  For each of 
these analyses, the camera system was assumed to be operating and the appropriate environmental heat 
fluxes were applied to the model. 
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Both components of the EVA IR Camera system (RCU and CBU) were designed to be fabricated with 0.10 
inch thick Aluminum Alloy 6061-T6.  All of the radiator surfaces on the camera housing were assumed to 
be covered with 5 mil silver Teflon tape.  Because the camera system is a handheld tool, it is impossible to 
ensure that the solar flux never impinges onto any given radiator surface.  Because silver Teflon tape has a 
very low solar absorptivity, the solar load on the camera housing’s radiator surface is reduced through the 
use of this coating.  All of the remaining surfaces were assumed to be covered with 8-layer MLI.  The 
outermost layer of the MLI for both units was assumed to be beta cloth.  The beta cloth is added as an outer 
layer to the MLI to add ruggedness to the design. 
As mentioned above, the extreme thermal environments that the camera could ever experience during an 
EVA were obtained using the IETED.  Using the thermo-optical properties for the camera system, the 
database provided a six-sided flux cube that maximized the absorbed environmental load for the camera 
system’s hot case and minimized the same for the camera system’s cold case.  The IETED includes the 
environmental heat flux loading due to solar heating as well as IR heating.  The IR heating load is due to 
both the IR heating associated with the Earth as well as that attributed to the presence of ISS and the 
docked orbiter.  The worst-case hot environmental, total (both IR and solar), incident (not absorbed), 
transient, heat flux profile for a single orbit is shown in figure 4.  Figure 3 shows the worst-case cold 
environment for the EVA IR Camera system.  It is important to note that these environments are not 
necessarily representative of the environments that are expected for the EVA IR Camera.  Rather these 
environments represent the most severe thermal environments located anywhere within the immediate 
vicinity of the ISS and the docked orbiter for the thermo-optical properties of the camera system.  In 
comparing figure 2 and figure 3, it is obvious that the integrated heat load to the system is much higher for 
the hot case as compared to the cold case. 
The goal for the design of the thermal control subsystem for the camera housing and RCU was to create a 
robust subsystem so that the camera could be used with minimal operational requirements for the astronaut.  
A detailed, transient, finite element model (FEM) was created for both the CBU and RCU.  In order to 
accomplish the goal of a robust design, several conservative assumptions were included in the thermal 
model.  For the operational hot case, the CBU and RCU were chosen to be oriented so that the total, 
absorbed, environmental heat load was maximized.  Another conservative assumption in the thermal model 
is the idea that the camera system operates continuously for a period of 8 hours.  The planned EVA time for 
the IR camera will be much less than 8 hours.  The thermal analysis for the CBU showed that the maximum 
surface temperature reached 53.7°C during its operational mode as shown in figure 4.  In an effort to 
determine the thermal resistance between the camera housing and the electronic components, several 
thermal vacuum tests were performed.  These tests showed the maximum temperature difference between 
the components and the surface to be approximately 9°C.  Therefore, the electronic components reach a 
temperature of approximately 63°C during the hot case operational scenario described herein, which is 
lower than the manufacturer’s recommended temperature limit of 70°C.  In much the same way, an extreme 
cold case operational scenario was considered for the CBU and the RCU.  However, in the reverse way as 
before, conservatism was added to the analysis by orienting the components so that the total absorbed 
energy was minimized throughout the EVA.  Figure 4 shows the temperature response of the CBU during 
the cold case operational scenario.  This figure shows that the minimum temperature attained by the CBU 
was -5.4°C.  The critical temperature is not of the camera housing, it is the internal electronic components.  
As before, it was necessary to add the nine degree temperature difference to obtain a minimum component 
temperature of approximately 4°C.  The minimum published operational temperature for the electronics is 
0°C. 
In addition the detailed thermal analysis described above for the camera housing, a very similar analysis 
was completed for the RCU.  The same conservative assumptions were used in the initial analysis of the 
RCU.  The conductive path from the electronic components to the housing was much more effective for the 
RCU as compared with the camera housing.  The same thermal vacuum tests discussed above showed that 
the electronic components internal to the RCU ran approximately 2°C hotter than the aluminum housing.  
The first analysis for RCU hot case showed that the temperature of the electronic components internal to 
the RCU exceeds their maximum operating limit after approximately 1.5 hours of continuous use and 
exposure to the extreme hot case environment described above.  The first analysis was refined to remove 
some of the conservatism and obtain a more accurate solution.  The idea that the RCU would be oriented in 
a manner so that the total environmental flux absorbed by the camera is maximized for the entire duration 
of an 8-hour EVA is obviously overly conservative.  Therefore, another analysis was performed taking 
advantage of the fact that it is known in advance that the astronaut will be using the RCU with the sun 
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located behind him and the RCU situated in front of him.  A second, more realistic, analysis was completed 
assuming that the crewmember would shadow the RCU face from the solar loading due to the sun.  The 
results from this analysis show that the RCU surface temperature reaches 54.8°C after 8 hours of 
continuous operational use.  The temperature response of the RCU is shown in figure 5.  Adding 2°C to the 
case temperature shows that the internal electronic components reach approximately 57°C during the EVA.  
As stated above, the maximum use temperature of these electronic components is 70°, well above the 
maximum predicted temperature.  The temperature response for the cold case analysis of the RCU is also 
shown in figure 5.  As shown in this figure, the minimum temperature for the RCU housing was calculated 
to be approximately 11°C.  The minimum predicted temperature for the electronic components internal to 
the RCU during operational use was 13°C, which is well above the minimum published limit of 0°C. 
In addition to the thermal analysis, the camera units were put through a rigorous environmental test 
program which included an acceptance thermal vacuum test, a qualification thermal vacuum test, and an 
extensive burn-in test. 
There were two primary reasons for performing the thermal vacuum tests.  The first of these reasons is to 
cycle the cameras to ensure that the EVA IR Camera and the associated electronic components operated 
when exposed to the on-orbit temperature extremes.  The other reason for performing the thermal vacuum 
test was to verify the thermal model used to calculate the temperature response of the IR Camera system.  
All of the temperature limits for the thermal vacuum tests were derived from the analysis results described 
above.  The acceptance thermal vacuum test was completed for all of the flight units prior to delivery as 
well as the qualification unit.  Thermal vacuum requirements state that the acceptance thermal vacuum 
levels should be equal to the maximum and minimum predicted temperature provided that the temperature 
difference between the hot and cold case extremes is a minimum of 55°C. 
The predicted temperature difference between the hot and cold case extremes for the CBU was 
approximately 59°C.  The calculated temperature difference for the RCU was only 44°C, so the acceptance 
thermal vacuum levels had to be modified to accomplish the 55°C temperature change. 
For the qualification thermal vacuum test, the limits were substantially increased to account for uncertainty 
in the thermal analysis calculations.  For this test, both the CBU and the RCU unit were tested outside of 
the manufacturer’s published temperature range.  Both units operated flawlessly throughout the entire 
qualification thermal vacuum test. 
The burn-in test was completed on all of the flight units as well as the qualification unit.  Of course, the 
burn-in test was performed in a standard pressure environment.  The four temperature setpoints were 
derived using the minimum/maximum operating and non-operating temperature defined by the camera 
manufacturer. Unlike the temperature limits described for the thermal vacuum test, the driving temperature 
for the burn-in test was the ambient temperature not the surface temperature of the hardware.   
 
Table 1 summarizes all of the temperature setpoints used in the verification and validation of the EVA IR 
Camera system. 
 
 
Table 1.  Temperature setpoints used for the environmental testing of the EVA IR Camera. 
 Acceptance 
Thermal Vacuum 
Qualification 
Thermal Vacuum 
Burn-In Test 
(Air Temperature) 
 CBU RCU CBU RCU Operating Non-Operating 
Hot 54°C 58°C 64°C 68°C 40°C 60°C 
Cold -5°C 2°C -15°C -8°C -5°C -30°C 
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           figure 4                                                        figure 5 
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CAMERA OPERATON 
 
Early in the program, the team selected a Model S-65 Infrared Camera manufactured by FLIR Corporation 
as an off-the-shelf model to modify into a flight unit.  FLIR was eager to work with NASA to transform 
their commercial product into a space flight instrument. 
Great emphasis was placed on delivery of a camera that functioned correctly, and was ideally suited to the 
mission. Camera operation and user interfaces needed to be optimized for use in the harsh environment. 
User involvement was a key step in this process. The team decided early on to incrementally develop the 
system using prototypes and engineering units which were continuously evaluated and refined by the user 
(Astronauts). 
 
BLUE ROOM TEST 1                                                                                                 
After we designed and built the first prototype, we held a 1-G Suited 
EVA Evaluation, known as a “Blue Room Test”.  The team built two 
different brackets to mount the Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
IR Camera.  Three experienced astronauts were recruited to help in 
the evaluations.   
The evaluations consisted of Different Translation Options, Remote 
Control Cable Length and Cable Management options, Camera Lens 
Insulation options, Ball Joint mounting of the Camera Body, Camera 
Body Switches and Switch Guards, Bayonet options, Remote Control 
Shape, Remote Control Cable, and Shadowing Options.   
It was clear from the testing that the form factor needed to change significantly.  
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TABLE-TOP EVALUATION 
 
The Table-Top Evaluation is an informal event in which several astronauts get a chance to evaluate a 
mockup of the new design and suggest ways to improve it.  This permits the team to get feedback from a 
larger group of experienced astronauts.  Incorporating this feedback into the design, the team improved the 
bracket, the designs of the Lens Insulation, Ball Joint, Camera Body Switches, Bayonet, Remote Control 
and Remote Control Cable. 
 
NEUTRAL BUOYANCY LABORATORY (NBL) TEST 
The NBL is a very large pool with the dimensions of 202 feet x 102 feet x 40 feet deep and holds 6.2 
million gallons of water.  It contains mockups of the Space Station Modules and the Space Shuttle’s cargo 
bay and Remote Manipulator System (RMS, also known as the Canadian Arm).  Astronauts wear 
extravehicular mobility units (spacesuits) in the water and are made neutrally buoyant to neither rise nor 
fall in the tank.  This reduces the sensation of gravity and provides a very useful simulation for learning 
firsthand about working in the space environment. 
The NBL allowed the astronauts to get a feel for how the modified camera would work in space.  It was 
used to evaluate the different translation options, Remote Control Cable Management and Minimum Cable 
Length, Ingress Aid Clamp, Bayonet options, and Shadowing Methods.  It also provided another chance for 
astronauts to give feedback and suggest design changes. 
 
BLUE ROOM TEST 2 
For the second Blue Room test, the team had a Camera Mockup that was close to the Flight Configuration.  
The designs of most components were improved to reflect what was learned in previous evaluations.  
The Second Blue Room test evaluated the different Methods for Translation 
with the camera, different Remote Control Cable options, Lens Insulation 
options, Camera Button Configurations, Camera Operation, Camera Ball 
Joints, Camera Body Switches, Camera Body Bracket, the Clockable 
Bayonet, and options for the shape of the Remote Control Unit.  The team 
also evaluated the possible use of a clamp to mount the camera body to the 
Ingress Aid and developed initial Shading methods.  
The team was now ready to start building flight hardware and begin 
production firmware development.  Firmware modifications include the 
following: 
– Functions/Button remapped as a result of removing Joystick (below). 
– Several Functions/Buttons were remapped to increase accessibility  
      to critical capability. 
– Enhanced existing functions to improve mission effectiveness. 
– Disabled Functions/Menus that were not required. 
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The system menu display (above) was simplified considerably to increase user efficiency. The above figure 
summarizes the results of this optimization. 
 
 
 
Additionally, the firmware was modified to include critical data parameters into recorded sequence files 
(below). This data would be extremely helpful to the ground processing and performance evaluation of the 
system. 
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The finished system as delivered to the Johnson Space Center is shown in the picture below. 
 
 
 
 
High level of teamwork between the development team and customer (and customer representatives) 
reduced the chances of major issues at the end of the project. Design and Certification requirements were 
identified early, and refined often to allow the team to be prepared for the delivery and certification 
process. A few items surprised the team, but many less than if each party worked in a vacuum.  
User representatives (Astronauts) reviewed design prototypes early and often to refine design concepts and 
correct system problems. A high level of user satisfaction resulted. 
 
 
 
